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Abstract This is a personal essay, written from the viewpoint of an ordinary citizen 
to nuclear engineers, on the necessity of communicating vital information about 
radioactive contamination to the public during times of normalcy as well as times 
of crisis. I have no expert knowledge of nuclear energy, nor was I involved in the 
PAGES 2011 Summer School from which this book emerges. I was invited by the 
chief editor to contribute a chapter about communication from my point of view 
as a literary scholar, ESL instructor, and American living in Japan (since 1987). In 
this chapter, I advocate the creation of a “library” of essential knowledge of nuclear 
energy in general, and radioactive contamination in particular, to serve the needs of a 
non-expert public. This “library” would be online, constantly updated, robust, truth-
ful, transparent, comprehensible to lay readers, and politically neutral. My appeal 
to nuclear engineers to undertake such a task is presented through six topics which 
allow me to address the social needs and concrete skills involved in knowing what, 
how, and why to communicate: (1) transparency and comprehensibility, (2) the 
Ex-SKF blog/ger, (3) meeting Joonhong Ahn, (4) teaching “Fukushima” in my liter-
ature course, (5) the concept and practice of a “scientist citizen” (referring to Cecile 
Pineda’s Devil’s Tango as one model), and (6) the reciprocal entity “citizen scientist.”
Keywords Communication between nuclear experts and laypersons · Online 
nuclear science library · Lunchbox-toolbox · Scientist citizen · Citizen scientist · 
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23.1  A Request: From GKS1350021 to Nuclear Engineers
This chapter is about communication between nuclear experts and the public in the 
wake of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP that began on March 11, 2011.
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As GKS1350021—the alphabets are my initials; the number is my zip code in 
Tokyo—I write in the spirit of an open letter to present and future nuclear engi-
neers around the world. I am not a nuclear engineer or social scientist involved 
in the project reported on and responded to through this book. I have no special 
expertise regarding any aspect of nuclear energy. I am a literature scholar born and 
raised in Hawai’i, and citizen GKS1350021. The potential value of what I have to 
say regarding issues addressed in this volume derives solely from personal values 
shaped through many years of studying and teaching literature, social relationships 
acquired in the communities that raised me, and what I have experienced as an 
American citizen residing in Japan since 1987. But I call attention to these facts 
because paying attention to someone’s specifically sited existence underpins suc-
cessful communication in any situation, all the more so in times of crisis.
In the case of Fukushima Daiichi NPP as it was handled by the Japanese gov-
ernment and TEPCO, communication grounded in a sense of accountability to 
specific individuals was profoundly lacking. Citizens like GKS1350021 sud-
denly needed hard facts about nuclear power plants and wanted their information 
from experts, not politicians or industry insiders, yet we looked to Government 
and TEPCO to facilitate getting that information to us. We sought this informa-
tion from our standpoints as individual human beings; our concerns as consumers 
of electricity, owners of TEPCO stock, or supporters of this or that political party 
were also real, but secondary in those first days and weeks. On March 11, our first 
thoughts turned automatically to ascertaining the safety of family, relatives, neigh-
bors, and friends. As images of survivors throughout the Tohoku region materi-
alized on television and computer screens, we struggled to grasp and respond to 
their need for shelter, water, food, and medical care. But within days our energies 
were taken over—if our homes had escaped damage, if we had not lost electricity, 
if we were not caught up in the confusion of evacuation zones—by the shock of 
water and food contamination fanning out from Fukushima Daiichi NPP. Panic, 
dread, anger, and depression set in, fueled by a shortage of reliable information, by 
Government and industry leaders who refused to tell us clearly and precisely what 
was really happening, or at the very least, whatever they themselves knew.
Citizens like GKS1350021 expected the Prime Minister and his staff, if not 
TEPCO management, to facilitate dissemination of information from nuclear 
experts as to what exactly was happening at Fukushima Daiichi NPP, and to trans-
mit information from specialists in radiology, medicine, and nuclear physics as to 
what the nuclear meltdowns meant in terms of short- and long-term environmen-
tal contamination and how that contamination translated into specific dangers to 
water, food, and the human body. But however much citizens like GKS1350021 
looked to their political and industry leaders to receive such information in a 
timely, continuous, and accessible manner, we waited in vain. As days turned to 
weeks and months, alongside images of earthquake-tsunami survivors search-
ing for family members and adjusting to life in shelters or stranded communities, 
alongside surreal scenes from a nuclear power plant in tatters, we were also forced 
to witness the political jousting in Nagata-chō as the LDP, DPJ and other parties 
devoted themselves to exploiting the nuclear accident to regain or retain political 
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power. Radioactive contamination filled me with dread; the landscape of ruin 
along the coasts of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima filled me with despair. But the 
sickening spectacle in Nagata-chō filled me with rage.
In a crisis, governments justify censorship with the need to “maintain order” 
and “prevent panic.” I remember thinking then (in March, April, May, June, July 
2011), and still believe now, that if instead of communication aimed at pacifying 
the population and evading accountability, we had been told the stark truth of what 
was probably/happening, to the extent that it was known or could be reasonably 
inferred, such communication would have done far more good than harm.
Let us say that one day, I am told in no uncertain terms that my vital organs 
have suffered a meltdown and I have 6 months left on this earth. I think I would 
want to know precisely what to expect as things deteriorate, so that I could decide 
how best to live those 6 months. Although it’s possible that I might panic or fall 
into debilitating depression when I get the information I demand, it’s equally 
imaginable that, motivated by a heightened appreciation of my own life and a 
sense of responsibility to others, I would neither panic nor plunge into despair, 
but work productively to put my affairs in order for the benefit of those who will 
survive me.
I know, of course, that this is not a perfect analogy for arguing the probable or 
possible impact on, say, the 13.5 million residents of Tokyo if they had been told 
immediately and straightly that there were three meltdowns and exactly where the 
toxic plumes had gone and which cancer-inducing elements were in them. No one 
can say for sure what percentage of Tokyo’s 13.5 million would have tried to flee 
Tokyo (beyond whatever number who actually did in March 2011) in response to a 
hypothetical government strategy of 100 % truth-telling. No one can say with cer-
tainty what new crises would have been triggered by such an exodus as it clogged 
transportation routes and consumed all available shelters and food supplies, which 
were already disappearing due to hoarding. Even if only 1 % fled the metropo-
lis, could 135,000 people so easily find a new place to live, and for how long if 
they left their former workplaces? If 10 % of Tokyo fled, that’s 1,350,000 people 
looking for a place to live and work. So let me acknowledge again that I have no 
“scientific” basis for imagining responses other than mass panic and chaos if gov-
ernment and TEPCO had chosen the path of relentlessly truthful communications 
regarding the hourly and daily condition of Fukushima Daiichi NPP.
Nonetheless, a very different scenario remains a possibility, and therefore 
deserves as much consideration as the more automatically envisioned scene of 
mass panic. In other words, it is possible that large swaths of the Japanese citi-
zenry would have responded to accurate, comprehensive, straightforward informa-
tion about the nuclear accident in the way I like to imagine I would respond to 
a diagnosis of impending death with 6 months left to live. Large swaths of the 
Japanese citizenry, in response to witnessing the ethical courage of their gov-
ernment and industry leaders in stating the facts about the meltdowns and their 
probable consequences, and thereby demonstrating genuine concern for the 
effect of the nuclear accident on the individual lives comprising the body politic, 
would be moved, reciprocally, to pool and coordinate their individual specialized 
416 G.K. Sato
knowledge—as farmers, doctors, chemists, geologists, physicists, psychologists, 
therapists, caregivers, bankers, teachers, cooks, emergency aid workers, artists, 
trauma victims, NGO administrators, mothers, and carpenters, to name just a few 
domains of expertise. They would be joined by thousands more across Japan, ordi-
nary citizens like GKS1350021 without any particular expertise but able to furnish 
physical labor and time to help deliver the organization of specialized knowledge 
to specific groups of people in specific places whose situation would then be alle-
viated immediately upon receiving such help. In other words, I imagine that a 
different concept and practice of communication would have created a scenario 
quite different from what actually happened in the wake of 3/11. We might have 
witnessed a breathtaking, nationwide, coordinated emergence of individual human 
resources via a grassroots crisis management movement. In other words, a peo-
ple’s crisis management made possible and brought into being through a vastly 
different kind of communication from Government and nuclear industry leaders: 
unrelenting truthfulness via transparency and comprehensibility.
23.2  Invisibility Versus Transparency: The Ex-SKF Blog
If the radioactive contaminants released from the crippled reactors were terrifying 
because of their invisibility, communications from Government and the nuclear 
industry induced profound anxiety for precisely the opposite reason—because 
they lacked transparency.
For GKS1350021 in the immediate and prolonged aftermath of the nuclear 
accident, negotiating everyday life choices in order to minimize radioactive con-
tamination always came down to the issue of “communication,” defined here as 
the goal/s, content/s, and method/s of every act of sending and receiving informa-
tion, and the aggregation of such individual acts. Every act of communication is a 
decision originating in the minds of one or more specific individuals, about why 
and how to communicate what, whether in the course of routine work or times of 
crisis.
Indeed, my personal belief is that we can only exercise in times of crisis the 
forms and goals of communication we have practiced or attempted to devise dur-
ing the course of our routine work. There is a lot of talk these days about “thinking 
outside the box,” but in fact such thinking cannot be expected from most of us if 
we have never been encouraged to understand or perform “thinking outside the 
box” as a viable form of response in ordinary life. Nor can we suddenly care about 
“society” as individuals if we are not used to conceptualizing Japan’s 127 million 
residents as individuals. In 2011 and since then, Government’s concept of “the 
people,” by and large, has been “a faceless entity to be pacified, deceived, and 
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ignored.”1 Their concept of “responsibility to the citizenry,” judging by their 
actions and more tellingly their non-actions, has meant protecting the political life 
of politicians, or doing whatever was necessary to enable the nuclear industry to 
carry on business as usual. On NHK and other TV stations, although there was 
nonstop “coverage” of the nuclear accident in the first weeks after March 11, 
I cannot recall seeing any instance of Japanese nuclear experts organizing them-
selves as an independent professional community to address the public in compre-
hensible language about what they were observing or surmising was happening at 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP, or what they understood to be the consequences for the 
human body of what they were seeing as it unfolded each day.
What does transparency look like when communication is dedicated to convert-
ing the invisibility of radioactive contamination, and the invisibility of political 
and industrial practices, into tangible, graspable knowledge in the service of public 
discussion and decision-making regarding nuclear energy?
By September 2011, I had discovered the Ex-SKF blogger.2 To be precise, 
I requested an email subscription to Ex-SKF on September 16, 2011, and that is 
when I started to read this blog each time a new post arrived in my smartphone email 
box. This was the first watershed in the relationship between GKS1350021 and 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP. In the half year from March 11 to September 11, I had 
become extremely worn out with the effort to search for, sift, grasp, assess, and cor-
relate information on the situation in Fukushima as well as my residential neighbor-
hood in Tokyo’s Koto Ward. I live about 6 km north of Tokyo Bay, where radioactive 
ash has been deposited as landfill, and about 4 km west of the Arakawa River, where 
an incinerator for regular household garbage burns debris trucked in from Tohoku. 
These policies were part of the unfathomable thinking of Government that spreading 
the toxic debris throughout Japan constituted an act of patriotism, democracy, and 
solidarity with those who had borne the brunt of loss and injury from the triple 
1
 When I wrote these sentences, it had been almost 48 h since a man set himself on fire near 
Shinjuku station, Tokyo (29 June 2014) to protest PM Shinzō Abe’s determination, despite wide-
spread opposition from the public, to enable Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to engage in combat 
overseas by simply changing a longstanding interpretation of war-renouncing Article 9 of the 
constitution. The day after the attempted self-immolation, Abe’s “re-reading” became a fait 
accompli when it was passed by his cabinet. Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga’s 
response to the incident captures the irony of political leaders proclaiming sincere efforts to pro-
tect the country’s citizens while dismissing the importance of their individual identities or the 
injury done to their individual bodies. Suga declared, “The government should protect people’s 
lives and property as well as the country’s safety,” but as for the self-immolation, he brushed it 
aside by saying that while he was “aware of the incident” he was “not in a position to comment 
on an individual case” [1].
2
 The first post about the triple disaster reports that the blogger was able to make phone contact 
with family in Tokyo soon after the earthquake struck at 2:46 pm on 11 March 2011 [2].
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disaster. In the first 6 months after March 11, there were many things I felt I needed 
to know but couldn’t find answers to, because in the limited time I could devote to 
internet searches the information I sought in English was not easily discoverable on 
the web, or because the information I was able to access spoke of radiation in gen-
eral terms or for sites other than Fukushima, and thus was not easily applied by a 
layperson like me to the produce making its way into my local supermarket, let alone 
all the foodstuffs I was ingesting whenever I had lunch or dinner near my workplace.
At my local supermarket, it was now taking me one hour to get through what 
used to be a 10 min trip, because now I was trying to read every label completely 
to figure out exactly where every item of food came from. But at the same time 
I couldn’t help thinking: surely the labels are not 100 % trustworthy. No one who 
has read Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American 
Meal (2001) can ever fully trust food labels again. And what exactly does screen-
ing for radiation levels consist of or mean, since presumably not every single bean 
or carrot can be tested? Meanwhile, husband (an experimental psychologist) and 
son (a college student majoring in business) were weary and aggravated by my 
constant nagging at them: to not get wet in the radioactive rain, to avoid going too 
close to street drains and trees and shrubbery because cesium concentrations would 
be highest there, to not (for the same reason) enjoy wading through the fallen 
leaves that autumn of 2011; my list of Avoid This and Don’t Eat That was long. 
Meanwhile, I couldn’t very well launder every item of clothing as soon as someone 
stepped into the house, or have all of us shower down as soon as we got home, and 
what about our shoes and coats and bags (filled with personal belongings  neither 
washable nor replaceable every day) and non-food purchases that had passed 
through so many unknown locations before we picked them out and brought them 
home? I split into two people: the woman who nagged to keep from screaming, 
and the woman who watched the nagger and understood that she needed to figure 
out a better strategy for living in the post-Fukushima Daiichi world. It was in this 
state of mental and physical fatigue that I found Ex-SKF, and my heart leaped up 
when I beheld the original website featuring a fearless yet comical Ultraman as its 
mascot. The humor was bracing, the bilingual information a lifeline.
The Ex-SKF blogger does paste-ins of Japanese-language articles, often in 
their entirety, and provides links to the original sites of these articles along with 
translations into English, rendered in near native fluency. Besides textual informa-
tion, this blog’s archive includes videos, photographs, data in graph or chart form, 
and coverage from English-language newspapers and websites around the globe. 
(There is also a Japanese-language version of the blog.) In sum, the English ver-
sion of the Ex-SKF blog is a bilingual database with extensive coverage, and these 
two features have several important consequences.
First, readers who are fluent enough in both Japanese and English are enabled 
and practically invited to crosscheck the blogger’s rendering of Japanese-language 
information into English. Second, English-dependent readers like GKS1350021 gain 
access to a huge amount of information not available anywhere else, and impossible 
to locate on a daily basis short of devoting oneself, like the blogger, to such a project. 
Third, transparency is a guiding principle for re/presentation of information: Links to 
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original sources as well as other relevant material are provided, and when necessary, 
tips on how to access and read the information at these sites are also given, based 
on the blogger’s own prior experience in navigating those sites. Transparency means 
that little or no energy need be wasted on wondering how reliable or partisan the 
presentation of the information might be. I myself have never bothered to do a cross-
check, not because I trust this blog completely but because I’ve always known that I 
can check up on things whenever I want to. The archival trail followed by the blog-
ger is clearly marked for others to follow. This blog is not motivated by a desire to 
get the journalistic scoop, although it does take (justifiable) pride in pointing out 
when it first took notice of something that others did not begin to discuss widely 
until much later. Such transparency in reporting creates a deep sense of reliability 
and trust. I read this blog because it is dedicated to delivering accurate, compre-
hensive, constantly updated, comprehensible information to readers, all of which 
becomes instantly accessible for future reference in the blog’s archive.
In addition to culling articles on the same topic from different media sources, 
and in addition to a continuous flow of English translations of Japanese-language 
sources of information, Ex-SKF also provides personal analysis of the informa-
tion culled. When the blogger offers opinions or speculations, they are clearly pre-
sented as such. The line is always clearly marked between what constitutes the 
blogger’s commentary or analysis and what constitutes the information gathered 
and re-presented from a variety of media.
Finally, the Ex-SKF blog contextualizes the nuclear accident within global poli-
tics and economics. Events from around the globe are not ignored just because 
they are intrinsically unrelated to things nuclear. Quite the contrary: posting news 
about the Arab Spring, Obama’s reelection, or Tokyo’s winning bid to host the 
2020 Summer Olympics in a blog called “Covering Fukushima I (Daiichi) Nuclear 
Accident since March 11, 2011” [3], with the accompanying November 2013 
photo of the spent fuel pool in Reactor 4 (which eventually replaced Ultraman as 
the blog’s mascot), makes the point that a nuclear accident cannot be understood 
in isolation from the flow of global history. Further, this flow of “external” news 
includes, from time to time, events that will never be news anywhere except on 
this blog—things like the Ex-SKF blogger’s personal selection of music to cel-
ebrate Christmas or a birthday. Such apparently “unnecessary” contextualization 
of information about Fukushima Daiichi NPP is also part and parcel of Ex-SKF’s 
policy of transparency. We are asked to take notice of this blogger’s existence as 
an individual, although we are always aware of it in the personal voice that infuses 
the blog while not compromising its commitment to transparency. In the Ex-SKF 
blog, we receive our information from one individual human being, not a disem-
bodied voice that covers over the speaker’s stakes in the matters being spoken of.
Over the past 18 months, Ex-SKF’s rate of posting new material has declined 
noticeably.3 Perhaps personal circumstances might be partly responsible 
3
 Archive information at the blog site indicates more than 1,300 posts between 13 March 2011 
and 1 January 2012; 1,160 posts in 2012; 601 posts in 2013; and 127 posts in 2014 up through 
July 28 [3].
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(on January 26, 2014, Ex-SKF mentions being in bed for a week with the flu), but 
I think the decrease is largely the result of less and less information generated 
about Fukushima Daiichi NPP 3 years and 4 months after the start of the accident. 
A certain stability has been achieved, even despite the fact that (a) on-site contam-
ination is still extremely high and far from being fully ascertained or mapped, (b) a 
number of dire problems remain unresolved even if they are no longer regularly 
reported on in mainstream media (e.g. where to put the continuously generated 
radioactive water that cools the broken reactors; likewise where and how to dis-
pose of contaminated dirt, leaves, and other debris that have been collected through- 
out Tohoku and presumably will continue to be gathered up for disposal at future 
dates), and (c) we have no idea how much knowledge about the nuclear meltdowns 
was and still is being withheld from us by Government, TEPCO,4 the nuclear 
industry, or the media. To repeat: despite the immensity of the unknowns alluded 
to in (a), (b), and (c), a certain stability seems to have been achieved at Fukushima 
Daiichi NPP, which would explain the sharp decrease in postings by Ex-SKF. But 
this is not to suggest that Ex-SKF has become obsolete as a source of information 
or that its value has peaked. No, precisely because the current stability at 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP (or any other nuclear power plant anywhere in Japan) is 
quite fragile given the uncontrollable probability of a large earthquake occurring 
too close, and precisely because of Government’s unconscionable disregard of (a), 
(b), and (c) in its push to restart idled reactors and keep Japan dependent on 
nuclear energy without allowing the public a say in decision-making, the Ex-SKF 
blog remains indispensable as a bilingual, open-access, comprehensive, unfolding-
in-real-time archive of events at Fukushima Daiichi NPP, that prioritizes 
transparency.
For all these reasons, then, the Ex-SKF blog models what I think ought to be 
the key elements of an online “library” of information on Fukushima Daiichi NPP 
set up and run by nuclear engineers, who would also be dedicated to truthful-
ness, political neutrality, and transparency, and not averse to adding the occasional 
touch of Christmas music or other expressions of the human being of the library’s 
creators and operators. I envision this “library” as a necessary point of reference 
for both pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear groups, such that both groups can be enabled 
to see what they currently do not see, admit, or accept.
4
 A recent example of not being told what happened when it happened is TEPCO’s belated 
announcement on 23 July 2014 that on 19 August 2013, more than 1 trillion becquerels of 
radioactive substances were released over the course of four hours during a cleanup procedure 
at the No. 3 reactor of Fukushima Daiichi NPP [4]. As early as March 2014, the Ministry of 
Agriculture informed TEPCO that its decontamination work on 19 August 2013 had contami-
nated rice harvested from Minami-Soma during the same month, but the Ministry did not inform 
the people of Minami-Soma about the contamination [5].
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23.3  Lunchbox-Toolbox: Meeting Joonhong Ahn
If discovering the Ex-SKF blog was the first watershed for GKS1350021 in the 
wake of 3/11, the second watershed was meeting Joonhong Ahn at a 2-day sympo-
sium—Fukushima: Lessons Learned?—convened at Oberlin College on 9–10 
March 2012, to assess the wake of the nuclear disaster on its one-year 
anniversary.5
Besides Joonhong, who presented a paper entitled “Fukushima from 
Environmental Remediation, Waste Management, and Back-end of Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle,” other panelists included Kennette Benedict, executive director of 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Akira Tashiro, executive director of the 
Hiroshima Peace Media Center, David Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety 
Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Allison MacFarlane, then asso-
ciate professor of environmental science and policy at George Mason University, 
and since July 2012, chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But 
among all the panelists, it turned out that only Joonhong possessed detailed 
knowledge of the Japanese nuclear industry and actual work experience within 
Japan’s “nuclear village” [7].
So during lunch break on day one of the conference, I grabbed a seat next to 
Joonhong. His presentation turned out to have been the most technical, and the 
least familiar to me (a literary critic) in terms of format and presentation style, 
but as a specialist in remediation (one of several technical terms I picked up that 
day), I judged that he had the technical knowledge to answer my most pressing 
questions about radioactive contamination and the internal structure of the nuclear 
industry.
I no longer remember everything I asked him nor how exactly I phrased my 
questions, but I cannot forget one thing he said that became the most impor-
tant piece of information I took away from the conference: that even if all par-
ties agree to switch immediately and completely to renewable energy, the nuclear 
power plants cannot simply be shut down. It is not a matter of simply turning off 
a switch or dismantling the reactor buildings. The plants would need expert tend-
ing for a very long time, and it was of paramount importance to maintain a fleet 
of nuclear engineers capable of doing first-rate maintenance work on decommis-
sioned reactors.
Thus I was made to understand, over lunch, the naiveté of an anti-nuclear activ-
ism that calls for “shut down” without any idea of the actual procedures and time 
5
 Oberlin professor Sylvia Watanabe (Creative Writing) came up with the idea for the sympo-
sium, and it was co-organized with two other Oberlin faculty, Nanette Yannuzzi (studio art) and 
Ann Sherif (East Asian studies). In addition to main sponsor Oberlin Shansi, many departments 
and offices at Oberlin College lent their support to this event [6]. I had been corresponding with 
Sylvia since 2008 regarding mutual research interests that included atomic history, and so I knew 
about the symposium in advance. I went because I needed to hear, in a language I could under-
stand fully, expert assessment of what had happened and where we now stood, and I was able to 
attend because the conference fell during spring break at my university.
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frame involved in decommissioning a reactor even after it can be agreed upon to 
do so. How the absence of active nuclear power plants makes it difficult to train 
the next generations of nuclear engineers who must carry out the long-term work 
of shutdown. At this point I made the connection to what I had learned recently 
about the “gerontology” of aging nuclear weapons at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, including the problem of how to equip new generations of nuclear 
weapons scientists with the knowledge they need to care for increasingly fragile, 
volatile bombs if they do not have “active” sites of nuclear weapons production to 
learn and maintain their expert knowledge [8].
Lunchbox-Toolbox is my shorthand expression for insisting that a nuclear engi-
neer’s work must not be conceptualized and undertaken apart from the everyday 
lives of citizens. The mission of technology and science—the toolbox—is to serve 
the daily well being of citizens—the lunchbox. It is fairly easy to observe when 
this mission is being upheld and when it has been abandoned by noticing which 
one retains priority. If the lunchbox is sacrificed, it can only mean that the toolbox 
is perceived as accountable to no one but itself.
The literary critic Elaine Scarry has pointed out that a tool can be a weapon 
depending on whether it falls on a sentient or nonsentient surface.6 An axe is a tool 
when the human hand is on the handle and the blade is toward a tree, but an axe is 
a weapon when the blade is directed towards human flesh. Actually any object, not 
just tools but things like chairs or bottles of wine, can also become weapons. It all 
depends, observes Scarry, on whether an object is being used to alleviate or inflict 
pain.7 A chair is originally created to alleviate pain, to provide comfort; likewise a 
bottle of wine, or the axe that fells a tree for firewood to warm a home in winter. 
But each of these objects can become weapons when the intended or predictable 
result of their deployment is the infliction of pain: if the chair is thrown at some-
one, if the bottle of wine is poisoned, if the ax strikes down a tree simply to kill or 
maim it.
Lunchboxes, too, can inflict pain. Japanese schoolchildren were fed contami-
nated beef,8 and TEPCO stopped providing free boxed lunches (“obentō”) for the 
workers decontaminating Fukushima Daiichi NPP. The beef that young school-
children in Yokohama were made to eat could and should have been screened by 
people who knew how to do it properly, since by the start of the school year in 
April 2011 it would have been impossible for anyone genuinely concerned about 
children’s safety to dismiss widespread fears of extensive radioactive contamina-
tion as “baseless rumors” rather than trying to ascertain, through trustworthy test-
ing by trustworthy agents, whether the ingredients of school lunches were 
6
 Scarry [9], 173.
7
 Scarry [9], 144–150.
8
 67,000 children were fed tainted beef between April and July 2011 [10]. Yokohama schools 
undermined the well being of children in other ways [11]. Fukushima cattle, contaminated 
from being fed contaminated rice straw, got past government inspections or the farmers had not 
received instructions to stop feeding them rice straw; meat from these cattle was shipped to vari-
ous parts of Japan [12]. Free lunches were stopped for Fukushima workers [13].
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contaminated or not. After all, the fact that children face elevated risks of develop-
ing cancers compared to adults was already common knowledge prior to the 
nuclear accident. As for the termination of free lunches for decontamination work-
ers at Fukushima Daiichi NPP, that cost could and should have been borne as a 
sacrifice to someone else—if not the ratepayers whose household electricity bills 
went up 15 % since March 11, 2011, and who, for decades in fact, had already 
absorbed the cost of paying $25,000,000 worth of bribes to seven Prime Ministers 
as part of regular business practice,9 then surely the top echelon of TEPCO man-
agement, or former and present prime ministers, could take the hit to their own 
pockets to feed the front line of workers at Fukushima Daiichi NPP.
There were, however, many individuals with expert knowledge in nuclear con-
tamination who did step forward with their toolboxes, or were sought out by con-
cerned citizens who did not themselves have the necessary expertise, and these 
various individuals each labored to maintain the mission of technology/science to 
promote the well being of citizens. Though their individual names and contribu-
tions remain relatively unknown, their work demonstrates the power of the 99 % 
to change things no matter how inept or callous Government and TEPCO con-
tinue to be, or no matter how unfathomably inactive nuclear experts in Japan—as a 
collective—remain.
One example that I can speak of with firsthand knowledge, because I attended 
his lecture at Temple University Japan on 3 July 2012 [15] and soon after had the 
privilege of interviewing him for more than two hours on 12 October 2012, is 
nuclear physicist Ryūgo Hayano, who was instrumental in organizing early on a 
systematic, broad-based program to test school lunches in Fukushima for cesium 
contamination.10 His results from screening school lunches in Fukushima put 
many people at ease, illustrating how crucial it is to get experts on site as quickly 
as possible, who are capable of gathering and analyzing information properly. 
Swift and skilled intervention from experts enables the various problems arising 
from a crisis to be prioritized, and the most appropriate concrete responses 
applied.
But as we continue to seek out and look to the Ryūgo Hayanos of Japan for 
guidance and models of social responsibility from nuclear experts, let us always 
remember that lunchboxes and toolboxes are only as good as the hands that make 
9
 A former top official at Kansai Electric Power Co. has come forward to reveal a nearly 20-year 
history of doling out ‘top secret’ huge donations to Japanese prime ministers, funded on the 
backs of ratepayers. Chimori Naito, 91, a former KEPCO vice president, said that for 18 years 
from 1972, seven prime ministers received 20 million yen (about $200,000 now) annually from 
Yoshishige Ashihara, who served as both KEPCO president and chairman” [14].
10
 Hayano gave a PPT talk at CERN (The European Organization for Nuclear Research in 
Switzerland) on 4 April 2013 explaining his work in and for Fukushima: measuring cesium 
contamination in school lunches, assisting several hospitals with the proper use of whole-body 
counters, and figuring out a system for calculating radioactive iodine contamination in order to 
provide a basis for future government subsidizing of medical expenses for Fukushima residents 
who develop thyroid cancer [16].
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or use them, at each step of the way. Every single time a lunch is eaten or a tool 
deployed, an individual conscience has guided—or not—the action of the hands 
that assembled the lunch or wielded the tool.
The importance of speaking out about this crucial relationship between hands 
and toolbox took shape in my mind after I’d spent many weeks reflecting on the 
impact of my lunchtime conversation with Joonhong. Eventually I realized that 
I had received a significant piece of information from him not simply because he 
was an expert who could tell me such things, but because the telling was guided 
by personal values and communication skills that virtually guaranteed the trans-
mission of his knowledge to me, and my thoughtful reception of it in turn. I had 
gone to that conference carrying a year’s worth of anger, fear, and depression, and 
so I’m pretty certain that I came across aggressively and convinced of my moral 
rightness when I asked Joonhong how anyone in the nuclear industry could justify 
continuing to work for it in the wake of the nuclear accident at Fukushima. The 
way he chose to respond says a lot about the indispensability of communication 
skills for nuclear engineers, and what those skills consist of.
First off, there was the courteous demeanor without a trace of condescension 
but plenty of patience. He received my vehement criticisms of various individuals 
or groups of individuals with a smile while remaining diplomatically neutral; this 
had the therapeutic effect of letting me vent frustration while politely implying 
that it was not the most enlightened way to discuss exiting nuclear energy. Second, 
his technical expertise was informed by a personal take on the social politics of 
nuclear energy, for example his observation during the final roundtable at the con-
ference that every nation has the right and responsibility to decide whether they 
want to be nuclear or non-nuclear. Third, his patient, low-key manner suggests 
a generous pragmatism when dealing with entrenched systemic flaws or diffi-
cult individuals, which I surmise underlies his ability not only to have let a per-
fect stranger monopolize his lunch break and spend half of it venting, but to have 
worked so long within Japan’s nuclear village amongst colleagues or established 
ways of thinking he may not particularly like or respect.
That Joonhong would invite a literary critic to contribute a chapter to this book 
speaks volumes about his commitment to lunchboxes. For many weeks after the 
end of the conference, I kept trying to pin down exactly what it was that continued 
to linger in my mind, over and beyond that crucial piece of knowledge I had been 
given regarding the reality of decommissioning nuclear reactors. Eventually I real-
ized that it was the felt experience of the conversation itself, my direct experience 
of Joonhong’s way of communicating his expertise to me, that had transmitted 
what lingered in my mind long after the conference ended—my strong sense of 
his reliability and genuine concern for fellow citizens, and the hope this inspired 
in me. Writing about this episode now, I am struck by the indispensability of our 
most “primitive” and increasingly rare form of communication in this age of social 
networking—the face-to-face dialogue between strangers (to be distinguished 
also from chatting or light conversation). But let me take these thoughts one 
step  further. Even if communication skills are, finally, what enable transmission 
of expert knowledge to a layperson, and even if various “communication skills” 
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can be identified, practiced, and learned in order to facilitate such transmission of 
expert knowledge, in regard to the lunchbox-toolbox relationship—the obligation 
of science and technology to serve the well being of citizens—successful com-
munication means something more fundamental than this or that communication 
skill. It’s about whether engineers want to place expert knowledge in the service of 
others, and whether they succeed in communicating that fact when they speak to 
laypersons.
23.4  Remediation and GKS1350021: Teaching 
Contamination as a Literary Critic
As I said earlier, I live only a few kilometers from both Tokyo Bay and the 
Arakawa River; the Tobu sludge plant is located where the Arakawa empties into 
Tokyo Bay. In March 2012, Tokyo began receiving contaminated debris from the 
earthquake-tsunami to be burned in incinerators located in densely populated areas 
and built only to handle regular household garbage. Some of the ash residue 
(I wasn’t able to confirm how much) ends up as landfill in Tokyo Bay.11 In the fall 
of 2011, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara embraced this plan as a way to patriot-
ically share the suffering of victims of the triple disaster, and he finalized negotia-
tions without bothering to consult Tokyo’s 13.5 million residents. Certain aspects 
of Japan’s post-3/11 “recovery plan” are the psychological pathology of certain 
species of politicians: Who needs engineering expertise in remediation when 
 patriotism as defined by one man can become the basis for carrying out 
 “decontamination” and “cleanup”?
Because I was not out on the street supporting anti-nuclear protests, I tried to 
amplify their work in other ways. Twice a year since spring 2012, I have required 
the students enrolled in my lecture course, History of American Literature, to 
watch a video featuring 10 women from Fukushima who participated in a 
70-woman die-in on 7 June 2012 in front of the Prime Minister’s Official 
Residence in Tokyo. It was a protest against his plan to restart the idled reactors at Ōi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukui prefecture. Before the start of the die-in, the 
women visited the Cabinet Office and met with officials to voice their concerns 
and submit a letter of requests to then PM Yoshihiko Noda. In the video, the 
women speak in turns, directly addressing their questions and statements to a 
prime minister who is not in the room. At the end, the woman who hands over 
their letter asks him: “Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, what are you looking at? 
11
 From December 2011 to March 2012, radioactive debris from Onagawa, Miyagi was brought 
to Tokyo [17]. In May and June 2011, radioactive ash from incinerated sewer sludge, and sludge 
from water purification plants, was dumped in Tokyo Bay as landfill [18, 19]. On 3 November 
2011, radioactive debris from Iwate was brought to Tokyo [20].
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What are you looking at when you decide your policies?”12 This is not a question 
for the prime minister only; it is a question that any nuclear expert whose expertise 
affected the siting and operation of Fukushima Daiichi NPP should be able to 
answer.
Sometimes I pair the video with a poem by American poet Lawson Fusao 
Inada, “To Get to Fresno” [23]. Inada was born and raised in Fresno, California, 
except for the three years from 1942 to 1945 that he spent in a concentration camp 
for Japanese Americans. But he left Fresno after college, and never returned. So 
the poem, “To Get to Fresno,” is about how to remember and cherish a home/land 
that you have left permanently. Inada takes us on a trip around the world to enact 
the knowledge of different cultures and universal human being that Fresno gave 
him, and still gives him, whenever he chances to re-call this place in his heart. 
The poem leads us on a slow journey around the world, from Fresno to Fresnillo, 
Mexico, to the Ganges River, to Zimbabwe, to Moscow, to the tundra with its 
polar bears, and to many other places along the way, before returning to Oregon 
where Inada made his second home. I was hoping to get everyone to think about 
what it means to leave a home/land forever, and yet to remain there forever in 
heart and mind, and what it means to enter this phenomenon as a bystander. What 
does it mean for us in Tokyo, post-3/11, “to get to Fukushima”?
Sometimes I pair the video with a classic American picture book called A Tree 
Is Nice, written by Janice May Udry and illustrated by Marc Simont [24]. This 
is the first book I remember borrowing on my own from the public library in 
Kapahulu, Oahu, where I lived from age five through eight. My mother read it to 
me countless times, and later I read it for myself many more times. Trees are nice, 
we read and see, because they give us apples and a place to hang a swing, play 
pirate, or sit and think. They protect cows from the noonday sun, our homes from 
winter storms, and cats from dogs. We can rake up leaves in the fall and build a 
bonfire, or draw pictures in the sand with fallen branches. Trees make everything 
beautiful, we read and see, and if we plant a tree, we can watch it grow up year 
by year and point proudly to it, saying, “I planted that tree.” As a child I loved 
this book with a fierceness not easily articulated in words even now. I was able to 
buy a copy of it when I was in my thirties, after I happened upon it by chance in 
Maruzen Bookstore in Tokyo, some time during the first years after my move to 
Japan in 1987 and well before Amazon.com could prevent me from experiencing 
such joyous serendipity.
I like to think that teaching Fukushima alongside A Tree is Nice or “To Get to 
Fresno” is an act of remediation of the sort I am capable of in my line of work, 
12
 The video can be viewed [21]. Some of these women also appear in the documentary film 
Women of Fukushima (2012, Kugi Productions), by Paul Johannessen, Jeffrey Jousan and Ivan 
Kovac [22]. On June 8, the day after the die-in, PM Noda announced his intention to restart 
the two reactors at Ōi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukui prefecture. They were in fact restarted in 
July 2012 amidst widespread protest, but went offline again in September 2013 for a scheduled 
checkup. In May 2014, in a landmark decision, the Fukui District Court ruled in favor of a law-
suit representing Tokyo, Fukui, and twenty other prefectures to ban the restart of Ōi NPP.
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and therefore have a duty to perform. I believe that teaching “Fukushima” has 
become a moral obligation for Japanese high school and university instructors 
across the board, so as to equip present and future generations of students with 
a clear understanding of nuclear energy—its historical development, socio-politi-
cal contexts, and medical and environmental consequences—that will guide them 
when they take over the reins of Japanese society. In the first weeks and months 
after March 11, I could hardly bear to think about or look at trees, leaves, and 
dirt, wondering how much cesium had been absorbed into all the plants living and 
breathing between Tohoku and Tokyo and beyond. And although this acute sense 
of dread gradually faded, it was not because the cesium disappeared, but simply 
the lessening of a sense of crisis with the passing of time. The cesium (to mention 
just one contaminant) is still there, just centimeters below the surface of everyday 
life, its toxic half-life far from over.
23.5  Scientist Citizen: Cecile Pineda’s Devil’s Tango: How 
I Learned the Fukushima Step by Step
A “scientist citizen” is a layperson, an ordinary citizen, who acquires scientific lit-
eracy to exercise the right and duty of a citizen to work for the well being of all 
members of society.
The example I present here is Cecile Pineda, novelist and theatrical producer, 
whose anti-nuclear activism is based on extensive research into the history of 
nuclear reactors and radioactive waste.13 Devil’s Tango [25] was published on 
March 11, 2012. It is crammed with facts and figures about fallout from the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents, about the process of building nuclear 
reactors from the mining of uranium to the storing of nuclear waste (including 
CO2 emissions at every stage of this process), and about interconnectedness 
between the production of nuclear weapons and the production of nuclear energy, 
how depleted uranium from nuclear power plants has been recycled into weapons 
deployed in the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the War on Terror in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere.
In lieu of providing a footnote for every single piece of information that she 
discovered or rediscovered to write this book, Pineda opts for a reader-friendly 
yet robust style of citation. Distributed throughout the 200 pages of Devil’s 
Tango are roughly 80 parenthetical citations of books, articles, or websites, and 
30 substantial quotations, of which many are from sources not included in the 
13
 Four years before the publication of Devil’s Tango, Pineda wrote and produced Like Snow 
Melting in Water, a play based on a true story about the Japanese village of Ogama, located on 
the Noto peninsula in Ishikawa prefecture. In 2006, Ogama’s eight remaining elderly residents 
decided they had no choice but to move out, and sold their village to the Tashima Company, 
which planned to turn Ogama into a site for burying toxic waste [26].
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eighty citations. Nineteen pages of reference material are provided at the end of 
the book. This bibliography includes a list of permissions and acknowledgments, 
and an appeal for donations to the Fukushima Information Center for Saving 
Children from Radiation/Citizens’ Radioactivity Measuring Station, while also 
identifying:
•	 30 organizations which provide information on nuclear energy (such as the 
Federation of American Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Union 
of Concerned Scientists)
•	 17 websites concerning nuclear energy (such as Nuclear Resource and 
Information Service, The Fukushima Project (at SimplyInfo), The Energy Net, 
and Depleted Cranium (which seems basically pro-nuclear))
•	 18 activist organizations
•	 40 books
•	 48 articles.
Yet no matter how extensive or reliable Pineda’s investigation into nuclear acci-
dents and radioactive waste, her scientist citizenship does not emerge through 
research alone. Acquisition and deployment of scientific literacy is motivated by 
a certain concept of citizenship, and Pineda sets up two sensory exercises, at the 
start and end of Devil’s Tango, respectively, to indicate what this concept is. As we 
will see, scientist citizenship means protecting the lunchbox.
In March 2009, the spacecraft Kepler was launched from Cape Canaveral to 
search for other Earth-like planets where life as we know it might exist. Planets 
sighted by Kepler’s telescope become archived as KOIs: Kepler Objects of 
Interest. In November 2013, based on data collected by Kepler, it was calculated 
that some 8.8 billion Earth-size planets occupy the “habitable zone” of the Milky 
Way galaxy [27]. Two years earlier, a team of astrophysicists at UC-Berkley 
had already begun looking at 86 KOIs in particular from among these potential 
8.8 billion [28]. In the first chapter of Devil’s Tango, called “Habitable Zones,” 
Pineda asks us to think about these 86 planets in a particular way. First, we are 
asked to imagine each of them containing their own evolutionary history of life, 
an evolution from one-celled organisms into flowering plants and eventually into 
intelligent beings with the ability to use tools, compose music, and speak lan-
guages. Then we are asked to imagine what it would sound like if all the speech 
and music produced by inhabitants of these 86 planets were heard at the same 
time. But whether we want to attempt such a feat of imagination or not, Pineda 
points out that even the combined sounds of these 86 planets would only amount 
to 1/600,000,000th of the total sound produced by all neighboring galaxies, and 
therefore we cannot even begin to imagine how small the sound of our 86 planets 
would be in comparison to the total sound of the entire universe. Pineda opens 
Devil’s Tango with this experiment in imagination to remind us that Earth com-
prises no more than a mere speck of life within the entire universe of space and 
time, and yet, our love for life on this particular planet is infinitely weightier 
and more enduring than a speck of space and time. We can supplement Pineda’s 
exercise by trying to visualize any form of newborn existence, whether plant or 
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animal. As soon as we conjure up the most familiar images of flower buds or 
young leaves on a tree, or creatures hatching from their eggs, we are reminded that 
new life is utterly fragile and miraculous, and appeals to us for protection. This is 
the frame of mind—wonder and humility when witnessing the gift of life, and a 
sense of responsibility for the well being of all living things—that undergirds sci-
entist citizenship.
At the end of Devil’s Tango, in the chapter called “What the Light Was 
Like,”14 Pineda presents us with another sensory exercise to complement the first 
one. This time we are asked to imagine a scene called up from the author’s past—
her memory of gazing at trees bathed in sunlight. Pineda recalls how she was able 
to comprehend the passage of time by watching how the light moved across a 
grove. The light embraced in turn each tree and every part of each tree as the 
earth turned on its axis, a movement normally imperceptible to us yet on that day 
made perceptible to her through attentiveness to the caressing passage of sunlight 
over trees.
Both of Pineda’s sensory exercises are telling us to direct our gaze away from 
outer space toward this beautiful planet that we already inhabit, because without 
total regard for Earth, we risk destroying it beyond repair. Especially in the epi-
sode of remembering how sunlight moved across a grove, Pineda calls attention 
to the miracle of in/finite space and in/finite time that we are always capable of 
perceiving in the here and now. These sensory exercises re-inscribe a scientist’s 
understanding of in/finite space and in/finite time in the language and point of 
view of a poet. For although space and time are foundational concepts in all fields 
of inquiry, philosophy, art, science, and social science have different ways of rep-
resenting and thus comprehending space and time. The sensory images compris-
ing Pineda’s instructions for imagining the amplitude of 86 planets and thereby 
re-cognizing our commitment to planet Earth, and the sensory images compris-
ing Pineda’s instructions for seeing what she saw on that day of sunlight passing 
over trees, come from the discipline of poetry and exemplify her placement of 
the poet’s toolbox in the service of the lunchbox. The most prominent example 
of Pineda’s poetic language is of course the metaphor “devil’s tango,” which is 
used to illuminate the fact that nuclear history records a dance with death—Homo 
sapiens’ apparent addiction to nuclear technology no matter how great its known 
record of devastation and irreversible damage.
Poetic language is not something for writers or literature scholars only, but is 
part and parcel of the language skills needed by a nuclear engineer—by any sci-
entist or technician—to communicate specialized knowledge to laypersons, by 
virtue of the fact that poetic language is the primary language through which we 
comprehend and express the beauty of life and the gift of human being. To be a 
nuclear engineer without literacy in poetic language is to be like a computer with a 
voice, able to speak one’s expert knowledge but devoid of any context of lived life 
14
 Pineda [25], 202.
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as Homo sapiens. The same holds true for laypersons. Without acquiring literacy 
in the data, vocabularies, and concepts that comprise, represent, and valorize the 
work of scientists, laypersons cannot properly understand, evaluate, or improve 
their physical environment. Responsible citizenship in a post-Fukushima Daiichi 
world requires that each layperson have literacy in science, and that every scientist 
or engineer have literacy in poetic language.
Dear nuclear engineers, I am trying to convey two points about Devil’s Tango.
The first concerns Pineda’s ethics of communication. She is an artist and 
writer who instructed herself to acquire a scientist’s knowledge and vocabular-
ies. Doing so did not require her to discard or demote her expert knowledge and 
skills as a poet. She operated on the assumption that the domain of science was 
not separate from or intrinsically superior to the domain of language arts, and 
that the two domains of knowledge must speak to each other or risk degrada-
tion and death to both. She used her expertise as a poet to communicate cer-
tain truths about science and technology that may not be readily perceived or 
admitted by scientists and engineers. For example, that certain forms of tech-
nological or scientific “progress” (nuclear energy is one of them) create toxic 
byproducts with life spans of millions of years; that some things whose origins 
are beyond human memory, like a grove of trees basking in sunlight for genera-
tions, are beautiful and necessary to our lives simply because they are old-fash-
ioned, that is: fashioned in a space and time, and embodying a mode of life, that 
precede and exceed the conceptual categories and practices of modern science. 
This is not a rejection of science and technology per se, but an invitation to sci-
entists and engineers to reconfirm whether their activities protect or degrade the 
lunchbox.
Hence my second point about Devil’s Tango: I would like to suggest that it, and 
other books like it, become required reading for nuclear engineers. Understanding 
and appreciating what this book says does not depend on having a brain “wired” 
for poetry. Homo sapiens are, already, wired for both poetry and science to a 
remarkable degree. Rather, it’s a question of attitude. If scientist citizenship begins 
by assuming that scientific literacy is necessary for ordinary life, citizen science 
cannot develop without a reciprocal assumption that the regard for life expressed 
in Devil’s Tango is necessary to one’s professional life as a nuclear engineer. 
When I first mentioned this book to Joonhong at some point during 2013, and 
before I had read it myself, I was surprised (and then not surprised, after all) to 
hear that he already owned a copy and had put it in the bag he carried to work 
 everyday to make sure he got it read. Later he told me that while he could not 
agree with everything Pineda said, he respected her endeavor. The significance 
of this action (reading the book all the way through, making it a priority to do 
so) and response (partial disagreement anchored in respect for the other’s point of 
view) cannot be overstated. It means that a nuclear engineer met an anti-nuclear 
activist halfway in an attempt to overcome entrenched oppositions between those 
working within the nuclear industry and those who seek to abolish nuclear energy 
altogether. If experts and laypersons both step forward to meet each other halfway, 
communication is possible and becomes productive.
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23.6  Citizen Scientist: From Nuclear Engineers  
to GKS1350021
Dear Nuclear Engineers, will you take up the work of creating and operating an 
online, open-access, comprehensive, scrupulously updated, politically neutral,15 
and above all transparent and comprehensible “library” of nuclear science? Which 
would have all the features, pointed out earlier, of the Ex-SKF Blog, and if not 
Pineda’s poetic skills, at least her ability to communicate scientific concepts and 
facts in words accessible to lay readers? For this to happen, you must think and act 
like citizen scientists. You must understand that your value to society is not deter-
mined by your expertise; rather, your worthiness as a nuclear expert is determined 
by your motivations and actions as a private citizen.
Because: every technological artifact, from microchip to nuclear reactor, is 
developed and deployed by human hands, and each one comes into being through 
a very long chain of human hands comprising the entire process from manufacture 
through installation to deployment to maintenance. In a so-called normal state of 
affairs, we pay scant attention to this chain of human hands despite knowing that 
each pair of hands is attached to an individual human being whose skills and work 
ethic affect our lives profoundly through their effect on the final quality of the 
technological artifact they have helped to produce. On the other hand, the abnor-
mal state of affairs is when a crisis suddenly forces us to pay attention to the chain 
of human hands. In a crisis, such as the meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi NPP, 
not only do we begin to see the human agency behind technology that normally 
goes unnoticed, we realize how just a few hands can make an enormous and even 
irreversible difference in the way the technology under crisis will henceforth affect 
our individual lives.
How communication enters the picture: Although it is true, and not just fash-
ionable, to say that “telling the whole truth” can no longer be expected from 
mainstream media, one of the lessons learned by GKS1350021 is that turning to 
alternative sources of information via the internet or personal networks was not 
inherently more assuring or indisputably more reliable. Short of giving up on 
 filtering information altogether, the same questions will appear before us again 
and again no matter what the form of communication: How are we to understand, 
assess, and integrate the information that is before us?
After March 11, before I had discovered Ex-SKF, I succumbed to ostrich syn-
drome for a while. As the task of collating and sifting information from different 
sources became too exhausting, I perversely fixed my attention solely on NHK, 
15
 I know that 100 % political neutrality is impossible. What I am advocating is genuine self-
monitoring to avoid, as much as possible, having one’s analysis and reporting of information 
influenced by pressure groups, especially for-profit nuclear industries, Government, the military, 
and organizations who award grant money to underwrite scientific research. This is a tall order, 
but it can be done, and to do it imperfectly is better than to not try at all.
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cynically disengaged yet at the same time desperate for a centralized source of 
reliable information and praying for a miraculous shift in Government’s way of 
telling us what was happening. In retrospect, I can’t help but feel that precisely 
because of widespread cooptation of mainstream media by industry and 
Government, now more than ever we must restore the concept and function of 
“mainstream media” as a centralized, trustworthy, open-access “library” of the 
most updated information comprehensibly written.16 Given the enormous com-
plexity of nuclear science, the truly global impact of nuclear waste, and the ease of 
disseminating misinformation or non-information through the internet just as eas-
ily as accurate and reliable information, it is more important than ever to have 
such a “library.” And above all, the technical information accessed here must be 
communicated in such a way that every GKS1350021 can readily grasp it.
Here is a job for citizen scientists, for “nuclear engineers without borders.” The 
task of creating and operating a nuclear science “library” cannot be entrusted to 
Government or the nuclear industry, nor should it be delegated to scientist citizens 
whose knowledge of nuclear science is, in the final analysis, a layperson’s knowledge.
At present, information on nuclear energy comes to us primarily through 
staunchly pro-nuclear or staunchly anti-nuclear media, hindering meaningful dia-
logue between the two positions. A third party must enter the scene of commu-
nication because both pro- and anti-nuclear forces are not planning to go away 
anytime soon. For advocates of nuclear power, there is simply too much money 
to be made and the industry is also fatally entwined with supremely entrenched 
and secretive nuclear weapons production and deployment. Likewise, anti-nuclear 
advocates are also here to stay. They may seem infinitely disempowered by com-
parison, as non-profit organizations lacking influence in Government and industry, 
but they are just as tenacious in their goals and their numbers are growing.
Personally, I agree with the point of view that permitting the use of nuclear 
energy sanctions, no less than stockpiling or deploying nuclear weapons, the 
killing of human beings and the destruction of Earth (whether through the 
effect of nuclear energy’s lethal byproducts on all forms of life and the physi-
cal environment, or through recycling depleted uranium into so-called con-
ventional weapons). I am anti-nuclear, but I am also deeply pessimistic about 
whether the anti-nuclear agenda can ever succeed without dialogue (as impossi-
ble as that sounds) with pro-nuclear organizations and individuals, and whether 
16
 Also: If this “library” is replicated in different languages (Chinese, French, Korean, Persian, 
Russian, for starters) working on the library might prove in itself to be a valuable mode of peace-
ful and truly cooperative diplomacy. For the task of translating between languages to insure 
that the libraries are identical in contents cannot be accomplished without genuine teamwork. 
Individuals have to spend many hours in dialogue to confirm that they understand each other 
and agree upon the translations. Further, creating multi-lingual libraries would raise levels of 
foreign-language fluency among nuclear engineers, which in turn means higher levels of cultural 
fluency across national borders that would feed back into the task of maintaining a centralized 
database with multi-lingual access and relentless commitment to comprehensibility and political 
neutrality.
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the pro-nuclear agenda can ever change without dialogue (as impossible as that 
sounds) with anti-nuclear organizations and individuals.
Hence my desire to see the emergence of a third party, equipped with expert 
knowledge of things nuclear, committed to getting expert knowledge translated for 
comprehension by laypersons, and dedicated to transparency and political neutral-
ity. Will nuclear engineers fill this role? There are sixteen student essays included 
in this volume, and although at first I had intended to read them prior to drafting 
my chapter, in the end I set them aside until I had clarified what I wanted to say. 
And now having read through these sixteen essays by future nuclear experts, I am 
moved to see how they take up, repeatedly and in different ways, the problems 
and practices examined and proposed in this chapter. I am filled with hope that the 
“library” I dream of in this chapter may soon come into being.
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